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Abstract: Local municipalities have broad authority to regulate land use as 
provided in state legislation.  Like all higher forms of legislation, state law 
occasionally preempts local legislatures from enacting laws.  Generally 
preemption is appropriate when the area to be regulated by the local laws is 
comprehensively regulated by state law, the uniformity of the state law will 
benefit the localities, and inconsistencies in local law are harmful to land owners 
and municipalities.  This article discusses the pros and cons of state preemption 
on various types of land use regulation.   
 
*** 
 
 The signature approach to land use control in New York has been to 
delegate extensive discretionary authority to local governments but not to direct 
or prescribe local action. The recent passage of a law permitting localities to add 
provisions to their zoning laws allowing planned unit developments is an 
example.  In the last 15 years, the legislature has adopted several measures 
making it clear that local governments can require clustered developments, 
provide incentive zoning, induce the construction of affordable housing, provide 
for the transfer of development rights, among a number of other innovative land 
use techniques. This echoes the position of the courts which have held that local 
governments may invent means of achieving the appropriate use of the land as 
part of their implied power to zone. Both the courts and the legislature have 
encouraged and guided local action, rather than provide formulas that must be 
followed.  
 
 Consistently, the legislature has seldom preempted local land use power.  
Outside the field of utility regulation, there are very few examples of express 
legislative preemption.  The courts similarly have found few examples of implied 
preemption: finding that the legislature has regulated in such a pervasive way so 
as to implicitly preempt local action.  A rare example occurred in Albany Area 
Builders Assoc. v. Town of Guilderland, 74 N.Y.2d 372 (1989); the Court of 
Appeals held that a local traffic impact fee law was preempted by state 
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legislation.  The local law provided that developments that generate additional 
traffic must pay a transportation impact fee.  The court held that “the State 
Legislature has enacted a comprehensive and detailed regulatory scheme in the 
field of highway funding, preempting local legislation on that subject.”  Id. at 377.  
The court noted that “[s]uch local laws, ‘were they permitted to operate in a field 
preempted by State law, would tend to inhibit the operation of the State’s general 
law and thereby thwart the operation of the State’s overriding policy concerns.’”  
Id. 
In Ardizzone v. Elliott, 75 N.Y.2d 150 (1989), the Court of Appeals 
invalidated a wetlands protection law adopted by the Town of Yorktown that did 
not conform to the requirements of the Freshwater Wetlands Act.  The court held 
that the DEC had “exclusive authority to regulate state-mapped wetlands under 
the Freshwater Wetlands Act unless a local government has expressly assumed 
jurisdiction over such wetlands,” as provided in the state statute.  Id. at 152.  The 
court concluded that the language of the section did not give “any indication that 
the Legislature intended to provide for concurrent [s]tate and local jurisdiction 
over all freshwater wetlands.”  Id. at 156.  The court voided all local freshwater 
wetlands laws or laws that had not been adopted in compliance with the 
procedures outlined in Article 24.  However, this holding has been reversed by 
state legislative action. In 1990, § 24-0509 was amended to allow concurrent 
jurisdiction over wetlands between the DEC and local governments.  Obviously, 
in retrospect, the legislature had not intended to preempt local wetlands control. 
 
The Court of Appeals recently found another instance of implied 
preemption, in the field of awarding area and use variances.  In the case of 
Matter of Cohen v. Board of Appeals of the Village of Saddle Rock, 100 N.Y.2d 
395 (2003), the Court of Appeals held that the “balancing” test for review of a 
variance application found in N.Y. Village Law § 7-712-b(3)(b) preempts local 
standards.   Landowners had sought an area variance which was denied by both 
the local inspector and board of appeals based on local variance standards that 
differed from those prescribed in state law.  The landowners appealed the 
denials, claiming that the factors contained in the Village Law, and no others, 
should be used to review their applications.   
 
N.Y. Village Law § 7-712-b(3)(b) contains no express language of 
preemption.  However, the Court of Appeals in Saddle Rock implied the 
Legislature’s intent to preempt by reference to the history, scope, and purpose of 
the particular legislative scheme.    Localities involved in the Saddle Rock case 
argued that the state area variance standards represent a legislative effort to 
clarify and codify various common law requirements that existed at the time of its 
enactment, but was never intended to preempt the power of localities to enact 
their own standards.  According to the Court of Appeals, the legislative history 
does not lead to such a conclusion, but rather supports the landowner’s position 
that the intent of the Legislature was to occupy the field and bring some measure 
of statewide consistency to variance application and review process.   
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Based on the particular legislative history of Village Law § 7-712-b(3) the 
Court concluded that the “Legislature intended to replace the confusing ‘practical 
difficulty’ standard with a consistent test that weighed the benefit to the applicant 
against detriment to the community, in addition to other enumerated factors.”  Id. 
at 402.  “As stated in the Sponsor’s Memorandum, ‘[t]his legislation is provided to 
recodify the laws which guide the function of zoning boards of appeal to 
encourage improved local understanding and facility in implementing the statute.  
Further, this legislation seeks to incorporate and standardize the universally 
acknowledged concepts of “use” and “area” variances in state.’”  Id.  The Bill 
Jacket also noted that the current state of local variance law leaves localities 
open to a “high degree of potential exposure to litigation.” In fact, challenges to 
variance denials and awards constitute a significant percentage of all land use 
litigation in the state. According to the legislative history, the statute was enacted 
to clarify standards of review and set forth understandable guidelines for the area 
variance application process, benefiting both zoning boards of appeals and 
applicants.  A consistent standard would eliminate the “turmoil and uncertainty” 
that faced landowners and zoning practitioners with a consistent review process 
before zoning boards of appeals and the courts.  Based on this legislative intent, 
the court concluded that the fairly detailed state established variance standards 
were preemptive.  Id. 
 
The factors that seem to have led to the court’s conclusion in Saddle Rock 
that the legislature intended to preempt are: 
 
1. The state law was extensive in scope, like the highway finance 
law found preemptive in Guilderland. 
 
2. The record showed that irregularities in local practice were 
harmful to both municipalities and property owners.  
 
3. There were demonstrated benefits to uniformity of practice 
throughout the state. 
 
4. The diversity of local conditions from place-to-place does not 
seem to justify allowing varying local practice. 
 
Most generally applicable land use laws adopted by the state are neither 
as extensive in scope as the variance provisions, nor does their legislative history 
evidence an intention to solve a statewide problem by establishing mandatory 
standards.  Further, most such laws respect the great diversity of circumstance 
among the 1600 local governments in the state and recognize the need for 
differences in local approaches. The recent adoption of Planned Unit 
Development legislation provides a current example.  Until this year there was no 
separate authorization under Town, Village, and General City Law for including 
planned unit development provisions (“PUD”) in local zoning laws.  The authority 
to do so was implied in the delegation to local governments of the power to enact 
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zoning restrictions and create zoning districts.  One purpose of zoning is to 
insure that its provisions consider the character of areas and their suitability for 
particular uses with a view toward conserving the value of buildings and 
encouraging the most appropriate use of the land throughout the municipality.  
PUD zoning accomplishes these purposes.  Several court decisions had 
considered various applications of previously adopted PUD ordinances, implicitly 
upholding their legality.   
 
Notwithstanding this judicial evidence of implied power to adopt PUD 
provisions, on July 29, 2003, the governor signed a bill adding General City Law 
§ 81-F, Town Law § 261-C, and Village Law § 7-703-A to expressly authorize the 
local legislative body to enact, “as part of its zoning law or ordinance, procedures 
and requirements for the establishment and mapping of planned unit 
development zoning districts.”  The enabling statute’s stated purpose for 
“Planned Unit Development District Regulations are to provide for residential, 
commercial, industrial or other land uses, or mix thereof, in which economies of 
scale, creative architectural or planning concepts and open space preservation 
may be achieved by a developer in furtherance of the town comprehensive plan 
and zoning local law or ordinance.”   
 
The New York statute grants express authority to communities to enact 
PUD regulations, but does not contain requirements for its enactment.  The 
limited scope of the statute preserves the diversity of its application in the state 
by communities that have enacted PUD regulations and encourages more 
communities to do the same.  Planned unit development zoning provisions give 
municipalities an alternative to the typical Euclidean method of zoning.  They 
permit large lots to be developed in a more flexible manner than is allowed by the 
underlying zoning.  PUD ordinances may allow developers to mix land uses, 
such as residential and commercial, on a large parcel and to develop the parcel 
at greater densities, and with more design flexibility, than is otherwise allowed by 
the underlying zoning district.   
 
The PUD statute is not extensive in scope. Its purpose is simply to clarify 
local authority to enact such provisions and encourage localities to do so. There 
is no evidence that lack of uniformity in PUD practice is harmful or that there are 
demonstrated benefits to standardization of approach.  The presumption in New 
York, because of extreme diversity of circumstance among localities, seems to 
be that flexibility is assumed and preemption is not intended in land use law 
making.  There being no contrary showings, as existed in the Saddle Rock case 
with respect to variance practice, local authority to enact PUD laws of their own 
invention is clear.  
 
The state statutory provisions allowing localities to adopt incentive zoning 
provide a closer case, simply because the state law provisions are extensive in 
scope.  General City Law § 81-d, Town Law § 261-b, and Village Law § 7-703.  
These incentive zoning provisions authorize localities to pass laws waiving the 
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restrictions of local zoning laws to create incentives for developers to provide 
public benefits, such as affordable housing, parks, or infrastructure.   The best 
example of this incentive at work is when the local law allows a residential 
developer to build 10 additional housing units – waiving zoning standards to that 
extent - in exchange for making five of them affordable to households of 
moderate means.  This legislative scheme requires the local government to make 
several findings, and directs local legislatures with respect to the means of 
adopting incentive zoning laws.  Can we assume, because the scope of the law 
is extensive, that the legislature intended to preempt varying local approaches to 
incentive zoning?   
 
Municipal Home Rule § 10(1)(ii) permits local legislative bodies to amend 
or supersede provisions of the generally applicable state standards contained in 
the town, village, and general city law, unless the matter is preempted.  In other 
words, the state legislature has said specifically that differences in local practice 
are permitted through supersession where the locality exhibits its intent to 
supersede general state law.  Since a variety of general laws are extensive in 
scope and supersession of their provisions is permitted, the extensive scope of 
state laws alone is not enough to justify a finding of preemption.  So, in the 
absence of any findings in the state legislation of the harms stemming from the 
diversity in practice or benefits of standardization, there should be no implication 
that the state legislature intended to preempt.      
 
 In light of this background, it is doubtful that the Saddle Rock case 
foreshadows a more aggressive judicial attitude toward the preemption of local 
land use prerogatives.  There was some concern when the legislature began to 
codify and expand New York land use law in the early 1990s that it was directing 
or overtly guiding local control. These fears were consistently met with 
representations that the legislature was simply encouraging local governments to 
use their implied land use powers by clarifying and demonstrating that authority, 
not by creating prescriptive methods of behaving.  Local governments, using their 
supersession authority under Municipal Home Rule Law, remain free to invent 
other ways of using land use methods authorized by state legislation whether 
extensive or limited in scope.  These laws, including the new PUD provision, fall 
into that category of state zoning enabling legislation designed to encourage 
local action.   
 
A very different thought process, one concerned with the results of 
uncontrolled local discretion, attended the enactment of the variance 
prescriptions. The evidence showed clearly that localities were beset by litigation, 
losing much of it, and that landowners and neighbors were prejudiced by the lack 
of consistent definition in the award of use and area variances.  The adoption of 
few other state land use laws has been attended by evidence of such legislative 
intent. The Saddle Rock case will most likely be confined to its unique context in 
subsequent decisions of the courts.  
 
